

Acquisition and Analysis of Android Memory

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Outline

- Background
 - Live forensics
 - Android
 - LiME
 - Memory analysis
- Testbed, experiments and scenarios
- Results and discussion
- Future work

Publications

- Dimitris Apostolopoulos, Giannis Marinakis, Christoforos Ntantogian, Christos Xenakis, "<u>Discovering authentication credentials in volatile</u> <u>memory of Android mobile devices</u>", In Proc. 12th IFIP Conference on e-Business, e-Services, e-Society (I3E 2013), Athens, Greece, April 2013.
- Christoforos Ntantogian, Dimitris Apostolopoulos, Giannis Marinakis, Christos Xenakis, "<u>Evaluating the privacy of Android mobile</u> <u>applications under forensic analysis</u>," Computers & Security, Elsevier Science, [submitted] 2013.


What is Live Forensics?

- Traditionally, digital forensics deal with nonvolatile data
 - Hard drives, removable media, etc.
- Live forensics deals with volatile data
 - RAM (data in motion)
 - Must be collected from a running machine
 - We do not have absolute control on the environment

Why Live Forensics?

- RAM dumping provides both structured and unstructured information
 - Strings of application data, fragments of communications, encryption keys, etc.
 - Kernel and application structures
 - Processes, files opened, network structures, etc.
- RAM analysis can be used to detect and understand running malware

Why Android?



Android

- Java language for Android applications
 - *.apk files
- Each apk runs in a separate process inside its own virtual machine named Dalvik.
- The Dalvik VM relies on the Linux kernel for
 - threading, low-level memory management, etc.
- Security: No application, by default, has permission to any operations that would adversely impact other applications

Memory Acquisition

- LiME is a free tool for memory acquisition of Android devices (phones, tablets)
 - Works on Linux OS too
- Loadable Kernel Module
- Memory dump directly to the SD card or over the network
 - Network dump over adb (Android Debug Bridge)
- Minimizes interaction between user-land and kernel-land
- https://code.google.com/p/lime-forensics/

Creating LiME module

- Compile the source code of the mobile device's kernel
- 2. Configure the compiled kernel with the config.gz file of the mobile device
- 3. Compile the LiME module with the configured kernel to create the device-specific lime module
 - *.ko

Using LiME

- Connect the mobile device and the PC through USB
- Establish a network connection between the mobile device and the PC
 - Using the netcat tool.
- As a root user insert the lime module (*.ko) to the Android kernel
 - Using the command insmod
- 4. The **dumping** process begins !!!

Forensic Soundness of LiME

- Use emulator to get the RAM image
- 2. Use LiME to acquire the RAM image

Compare (1) and (2) to find identical pages

Total number of pages	Number of identical pages	Percentage of identical pages						
131072	130365	99,64%						

LiME limitations

- It requires rooted devices to execute insmod
 - to insert into the kernel the lime module
- It requires the source code of the kernel to compile and create the LiME module
 - Each device (model) has a different kernel configuration based on its hardware!
 - The source code of kernel is not always available
- It requires the config.gz file which has configuration flags specific for each device and for each kernel.

Memory Analysis

- After memory acquisition: Memory analysis
- Autopsy: a collection of open source forensic tools
 - provides an easy-to-use GUI for the investigator
- 2. Volatility: a free tool for extraction of digital artifacts from volatile memory samples (RAM)
 - Supports Linux, Windows and Android memory dumps
 - Discovers open connections, running processes, etc.

Goal of our work

- We investigate whether we can discover authentication credentials of mobile applications in the volatile memory of mobile devices
 - 13 security critical applications
 - 30 different scenarios
 - 2 sets of experiments > In total, 403 experiments!
- We have used open-source, free forensic tools
 - LiME and Autopsy

Tested Applications

- The examined applications belong to four (4) categories which elaborate sensitive users' data:
 - mobile banking,
 - ii. e-shopping/financial applications,
 - iii. password managers,
 - iv. encryption/data hiding applications.


Testbed

- Rooted Samsung Galaxy S Plus (i9001).
 - Android v2.3 (Gingerbread),
 - It was the most popular Android version, according to the Google's statistics [accessed June 2013]
 - 512 MB RAM
- Using LiME, the memory dumping process lasted nine minutes.

1st experiment

- Examine for each investigated application and studied scenario
 - 13x30 = 390 cases
 - whether we can discover authentication credentials
 (e.g., username and/or passwords)
 - in the physical memory (RAM) of the mobile device (Galaxy S plus).
 - the authentication credential that we are looking for in the memory images are known, (we typed them)

1st experiment



2nd experiment

- Explore in the considered applications,
 - 13 cases
 - if we can discover patterns and expressions
 - that indicate the exact position of the authentication credentials in the memory dump.

Scenarios 1/4

Scenarios	Description of steps
Scenario 1	
S1.a	Login, use, logout, immediate dump.
S ₁ .b	Login, use, logout, device idle for 10 minutes, dump.
S1.c	Login, use, logout, <u>device idle</u> for 20 minutes, dump.
S1.d	Login, use, logout, device idle for 60 minutes, dump.
Scenario 2	
S2.a	Login, use, logout, <u>use it as a phone</u> for 10 minutes, dump.
S2.b	Login, use, logout, <u>use it as a phone</u> for 20 minutes, dump.
S2.c	Login, use, logout, use it as a phone for 60 minutes, dump.
Scenario 3	
S ₃ .a	Login, use, logout, <u>use it as a smart phone</u> for 10 minutes, dump
S ₃ .b	Login, use, logout, <u>use it as a smart phone</u> for 20 minutes, dump
S ₃ .c	Login, use, logout, <u>use it as a smart phone</u> for 60 minutes, dump

Scenarios 2/4

Scenario 4	
S4.a	Login, use, set the application into the background, immediate dump.
S4.b	Login, use, <u>set the application into the background</u> , device <u>idle for 10 minutes</u> , dump.
S4.c	Login, use, <u>set the application into the background</u> , device idle for <u>20</u> minutes, dump.
S4.d	Login, use, set the application into the background, device idle for 60 minutes, dump.
Scenario 5	
S ₅ .a	Login, use, set the application into the background, use the device as a phone for 10 minutes, dump.
S ₅ .b	Login, use, <u>set the application into the background</u> , <u>use the device as a phone</u> for 20 minutes, dump.
S ₅ .c	Login, use, <u>set the application into the background</u> , use the device <u>as a phone</u> for 60 minutes, dump.

Scenarios 3/4

Scenario 6	
56.a	Login, use, set the application into the background, use the device as a smart
	<u>phone</u> for 10 minutes, dump.
56.b	Login, use, set the application into the background, use the device as a smart
	<u>phone</u> for 20 minutes, dump.
56.c	Login, use, set the application into the background, use the device as a smart
	<u>phone</u> for 60 minutes, dump.
Scenario 7	
57	Login, use, logout, use task killer, immediate dump.
Scenario 8	
58.a	Login, use, logout, switch the device to airplane mode, immediate dump.
58.b	Login, use, logout, switch the device to airplane mode, device idle for 10
	minutes, dump.
58.c	Login, use, logout, switch the device to airplane mode, device idle for 20
	minutes, dump.
58.d	Login, use, logout, switch the device to airplane mode, device idle for 60
	minutes, dump.

Scenarios 4/4

Scenario 9	
59.a	Login, use, logout, switch the device to airplane mode, use gaming applications for 10 minutes, dump.
S9.b	Login, use, logout, switch the device to airplane mode, use gaming applications for 20 minutes, dump.
S9.c	Login, use, logout, switch the device to airplane mode, use gaming applications 60 minutes, dump.
Scenario 10	
S10	Login, use, logout, reboot, immediate dump.
Scenario 11	
S11	Login, use, logout, <u>switch off the device</u> , <u>remove battery for 5 seconds</u> , <u>insert battery</u> , <u>switch on</u> , dump.

		Applications											Total no																
	[m-banking financial/e-shopping password managers encryption/hiding								ng	Total	Total per scenario																	
		bar	nk1	bank2 bank3 bank4 bank5 bank6 financial1 financial2				finar	ncial3 password1 password2					encryption1 encryp															
	s1.a	U	Р	U	Р	U	P	U	P	U	P	X	X	U	Р	U	P	U	P	-	P	-	P	-	P	-	P	20/22	
	s1.b	U	P	U	P	U	Р	U	Р	U	P	X	X	U	Р	U	P	U	X	-	Р	-	P	-	Р	-	P	19/22	22 80%
	s1.c	U	Р	U	P	U	Р	U	P	U	P	X	X	U	X	U	P	U	X	-	P	-	P		Р	-	Р	18/22	
	s1.d	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	P	X	X	U	X	X	X	X	X	-	P	-	Р	-	X	<u> </u>	Р	14/22	
Conneio	s2.a	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	X	X	U	Р	U	Р	U	X	-	Р	-	Р	-	Р	-	Р	19/22	51/66
2	s2.b	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	X	X	U	X	U	Р	U	X	-	Р	-	Р	-	Р	-	Р	18/22	77%
	s2. c	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	Х	X	U	X	X	X	X	X	-	Р	-	P	·	X	<u> </u>	P	14/22	
Conneio	s3.a	X	Х	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	Х	X	U	X	U	X	U	X	-	X	-	X	·	Р	-	P	13/22	32/66
3	s3.b	X	Х	U	Р	U	Х	U	Р	U	Р	Х	X	U	X	U	X	U	X	-	X	-	X	·	Р	-	P	12/22	48%
	s 3.c	X	X	X	X	U	X	X	X	U	P	X	X	U	X	U	X	U	X	-	X	-	X	·	X	-	P	7/22	-
l +	s4.a	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	-	Р	-	Р	·	Р	-	Р	22/22	-
	s4.b	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	X	X	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	-	Р	-	X	·	Р	-	Р	19/22	_ '
I +	54. C	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	X	X	U	Р	U	Р	U	P	-	Р	-	X	·	Р	-	Р	19/22	4
	s4.d	U	Р	U	Р	U	X	X	X	U	Р	X	X	U	X	U	X	X	X	-	Р	-	X	Ŀ	X	<u> </u>	P	11/22	1/22
Sconario	s5.a	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	X	X	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	-	Р	-	X	·	Р	-	Р	19/22	9/22 49/66 74%
5	s5.b	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	X	X	U	P	U	P	U	P	-	Р	-	X	·	Р	-	Р	19/22	
	s5. c	U	Р	U	Р	U	X	X	X	U	Р	Х	X	U	X	U	X	X	X	-	Р	-	X	·	X	<u> </u>	P	11/22	
Conneilo	s6.a	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	P	U	P	X	X	U	Р	U	P	U	Р	-	P	-	X	Ŀ	Р	-	Р	19/22	48/66
6	s6.b	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	Х	X	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	-	Р	-	X	·	Р	-	Р	19/22	72%
	s6. c	U	Р	U	Р	U	X	X	X	U	Р	X	X	U	X	X	X	X	X	-	Р	-	X	·	X	<u> </u>	Р	10/22	
Scenario 7	s7	U	P	U	Р	U	Р	U	P	U	Р	X	X	X	X	U	P	X	Х	-	P	-	Р		P	-	Р	16/22	16/22 72%
	s8.a	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	χ	X	U	Р	X	Х	U	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	Р	14/22	
Scenario	s8.b	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	U	Р	X	X	U	X	X	Х	U	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	Р	13/22	51/88
8	s8. c	U	Р	U	P	U	Р	U	Р	U	P	X	X	U	X	X	Х	U	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	P	13/22	58%
	s8.d	U	P	U	P	U	Р	U	P	U	P	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	P	11/22	
	s9.a	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	U	P	X	X	U	X	X	X	U	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	P	5/22	11/66
Scenario 9	s9.b	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	U	P	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	P	3/22	16%
	s9. c	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	U	P	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	P	3/22	1070
Scenario 10	s10	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Х	X	X	X	X	Х	Х	X	Х	-	X	-	X		X	-	X	0/22	0/22 0%
Scenario 11	s11	Х	Х	Х	X	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	-	χ	-	χ	·	X	-	Х	0/22	0/22
Total		22/30	22/30	24/30	24/30	25/30	20/30	21/30	21/30	28/30	28/30	1/30	1/30	24/30	11/30	18/30	13/30	19/30	8/30		18/30	-	9/30		15/30	-	28/30		
Total per cate	gory					7	237/360) - 65%	6							93/180					27/60	- 45%			43/60	- 71%			

- As long as the user does not employ the mobile device
 - powered on and idle,
- it is more likely the authentication credentials (i.e., data in motion) to remain intact
 - in the volatile memory of the device.

- To ensure that the memory of a mobile device does not contain authentication credentials or other sensitive data
 - Have to <u>either</u> reboot the device <u>or</u> remove its battery.
 - This has been also proved for desktop/laptop computers.
 - However, there is a fundamental difference in the usage of mobile devices and desktops/laptops

Observation 3 and 4

- Time is with security
 - The more time passes from the moment a user submitted his/her credentials, the more likely these to be deleted.
- Using a task killer application to end a running application
 - does not wipe out the related authentication credentials from the volatile memory.

- Setting up a running application into the background
 - does not delete the authentications credentials from the volatile memory of the mobile device.
- This is an alarming result, since it is a common practice among users
 - to set up the running applications into the background,
 - instead of logging out properly.

- Using a mobile device as a smart phone
 - it is more likely to erase the authentication credentials from the device's volatile memory.
 - a running application overwrites, previously, stored data in the device's volatile memory.
- Using it as mobile phone
 - does not engage the volatile memory of the mobile device

- Switching the mobile device to the airplane mode
 - the contents of the devices volatile memory are not necessarily erased.
- In cases that after switching
 - the mobile user activates and runs an application such as a game
 - the majority of the authentications credentials, are erased.

Observations 8 and 9

- The majority of the examined Android applications
 - are vulnerable to the recovery of authentication credentials from the volatile memory.
- It is alarming that even m-banking applications
 - have been proved to be vulnerable to the discovery of authentication credentials.

We found out that

- some Android applications <u>are secure</u> under the threat of <u>discovery of</u>
 authentication credentials (e.g., bank6 application)
- while some other <u>are, completely, exposed to this</u> (e.g., encryption2 and bank5 applications).

These results show

- some applications have been developed taking into account security & privacy precaution
- whilst some other not.

- Regardless of the criticality of the considered applications
 - developers should use correct and secure programing techniques
 - i.e., <u>delete the authentication credentials when they</u> are not used from the applications
 - this enhances the level of security provided by mobile platforms

- Password managers aim to enhance the privacy of users
 - by protecting their passwords,
 - but they were found to be vulnerable.
- If a user loses his/her device,
 - a malicious <u>may discover</u> all the <u>user's passwords</u>
 - only <u>by discovering</u> the master password of the employed password manager application

2nd Experiment - Results

<u>Username</u>	Password
j_username=	j_password=
username=	password=
userid>	password:
login i:type=	pass i:type:

- We proved the existence of patterns and expressions
 - show <u>where</u> the <u>authentication credentials are</u>,
 <u>exactly</u>, <u>located in a memory dump</u>.
- A malicious will simply search for these in a memory dump
- Developers <u>should avoid</u> using such patterns or expressions in the provided mobile applications.

Future work

- Test more applications
- Enhance LiME functionality
 - eliminate the current limitations
- Discover more data than usernames and passwords
 - cryptographic keys, deleted SMS, etc.



Thank You!

QUESTIONS?

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